Iran has vowed to continue with its nuclear programme in defiance of the torrential sanctions the West have been ramping up on the country, claiming that its nuclear arsenal is not for military actions. Iran has even threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a major passage-way for the world’s oil, in reprisal for the Western oil sanctions.
Consequently, this has not yet precluded the West from their hardline stance, as United Nations nuclear inspectors have embarked on a 3-day visit to Iran for a nuclear inspection. KINGSLEY OPURUM examines Iran’s prospect of surviving the pressure.
In the face of economic sanctions and international condemnation, Iran has remained defiant over its nuclear energy program. It has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a major passageway for much of the world’s oil, in retaliation for any embargo. And it has vowed to punish the United States and Israel, accusing them of being connected to the recent assassinations of some Iranian nuclear scientists. United States and Israeli officials have denied having anything to do with the mysterious killings, but they are not backing down on their hard-line stance.
“As long as (the Iranians) shirk their responsibilities, this pressure will not relent,” US President, Barack Obama, said recently in his State of the Union speech. “Let there be no doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal. But a peaceful resolution of this issue is still possible, and far better.” Tehran has insisted that it is pursuing nuclear energy for civilian purposes, not for military use. The US and its allies are not buying it.
Last week, Obama’s former national security adviser said he thought this could be the year that things finally come to a head. “I think 2012 has seen itself as the year that Iran has got to be dealt with one way or the other,” said James L. Jones, speaking at a panel discussion in Washington.
But what way will that be? Will a peaceful solution present itself, or will the situation devolve into a military conflict? In the last few months, tensions between Iran and the United States have risen to alarming levels.
The US and its allies are running out of non-military options of pressuring Iran, and Iran is facing economic strangulation. The two sides are moving perilously close to a situation where there seems to be only one option left: military confrontation. But war does not have to be inevitable. Not if both sides show flexibility and put their national interests ahead of a misguided national pride. The main stumbling block in achieving a compromise has always been the unspoken but ever-present US feeling that Iran must be taught a lesson, which it should admit to its wrong ways and repent.
Iran, meanwhile, has shied away from appearing to be buckling under US pressure. To overcome these psychological barriers, Iran must take concrete steps to alleviate US fears regarding its nuclear program. The US, in turn, must provide Iran with what amounts to a diplomatic fig leaf. Examples could be broadening the scope of prospective talks beyond the nuclear issue and offering Iran real incentives, lifting sanctions rather than promising not to impose new sanctions. As with any successful diplomacy, both sides could appear to be the winners in the end. But if war breaks out, both Iran and the US will lose big.
The external challenges are very serious. The Arab Spring has caused much damage to Iran’s standing in the Middle East, and Obama’s dual track of sanctions and diplomacy has brought isolation and very damaging economic sanctions. But what is happening at home is far more important. This is the place to keep an eye on. By backing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2009 elections, Khamenei alienated many other parts of the regime. Since then, he has lived to regret that decision, as Ahmadinejad turned out to be a serious liability, both for the regime and for the supreme leader’s efforts to create consensus.
Ahmadinejad is not only a divisive figure; he is also ruining Iran’s economy with his populist economic policies, which until very recently was to keep interest rates low. By flooding the economy with such liquidity, Ahmadinejad contributed to the devaluation of the riyal, which is already suffering from loss of confidence because of the recent sanctions. This will be the year that Khamenei will have to make a decision about Iran’s nuclear program. His current strategy of isolating Iran and not answering IAEA questions are justifying the sanctions that are ruining the country’s economy. The regime can live without its nuclear program, but not without its economy.
Even if Iran survives the sanctions, Khamenei will still have to solve the regime’s deepening divisions. This requires opening up the political system to allow other players within the system to take part, making the regime more transparent, and fighting corruption. This could be harder to confront than Israel’s military threats and Obama’s tough sanctions. The biggest obstacle to understanding what will happen with Iran is the uncertainty every side feels about the potential actions of every other side. The Iranians, the Israelis, the Americans and others are each trying to preserve ambiguity. The Iranians do not want anyone to know how close they are to having a nuclear weapon — in fact, they insist they do not want one at all — and the Israelis do not want anyone to know the circumstances under which they would take military action.
Politics will create more uncertainty in 2012. Presidential and congressional elections in the United States, parliamentary elections in Iran, and the prospect of early elections in Israel (combined with confirmed or potential leadership changes in China, Russia, France and Germany) suggest that leaders will see things through a political prism. Some argue that political transitions in the West may make it difficult for Western leaders to respond coherently to Iranian actions — that if the Iranians want to declare themselves a nuclear weapons state, this is the year. I think that is unlikely.
While the possibility remains that one side will pursue a limited war, it is more likely that the sides will stumble into a war that no side is seeking. Given the high alert on all sides, a rogue action or even a mistaken one can quickly turn into a shooting war. Tehran won’t sit idly by as the Obama administration continues its hard-line approach on Iran. There will probably be more threats, to choke up the Strait of Hormuz or retaliate outside of the Middle East, if the United States keeps clamping down and debilitating its economy. Even when the hits come from Israel, as recent reports about its support of Jundullah or the assassination of Iran’s nuclear scientists appear to indicate, the finger-pointing will be directed at the United States.
That is because it doesn’t do Iran much good to lash out at Israel. If Iran concedes Israel’s alleged role in the plots, they will put themselves under pressure to use their proxies, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, to lob missiles at it in retaliation. Instead, Tehran will point the finger at the United States, hoping Washington will pressure Israel to stop. Unless the leaders of Iran believe there’s a real possibility of regime change, they will not capitulate. They don’t want to lose face. Unlike the late shah, I can’t imagine Ayatollah Khamenei being coaxed to live out his days hiking in the Alps. He’ll fight to stay in power until the bitter end.
This heightened tension is very dangerous, especially given the lack of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States. There is no hot line. There is no real channel of communication like there was with the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War. A misunderstanding or miscalculation may lead to a war. And as many Iran watchers have pointed out, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities does not necessarily mean the collapse of the regime. It may actually help it consolidate power in the face of domestic strife and clashes within its own camp. At least that’s what the war with Iraq did for it after the 1979 revolution.